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Recent Case
HABEAS CORPUS-PRISON MANAGEMENT-CUSTODY
AND CONTROL OF PRISONERS-CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-FORMER JEOPARDY
In re Lamb, 34 Ohio App. 2d 85, 296 N.E.2d 280 (1973).
'Historically, the writ of habeas corpus was available only to
attack the legality of the prisoner's detention in custody, and the only
judicial relief authorized was the release of the prisoner from that
custody.' The imprisonment of petitioner was upheld as long as the
sentencing court had jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings. 2
Accordingly, the writ was not available to prisoners who merely pro-
tested the conditions of their confinement. 3 In Ohio, habeas corpus
relief is available under a statute4 that has been restricted in the past
by judicial interpretation to allow relief only in accordance with the
traditional scope of the writ.5 Nevertheless, in In re Lamb,6 the
1. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136-38 (1934), overruled, Peyton V.
Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968). See generally Note, Developments in the Law-
Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 H.{v. L. REv. 1038, 1040-45 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Developments].
2. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202-03 (1830).
3. See, e.g., Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 81-8 (3d Cir. 1968); Roberts
v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963) (petition erroneously filed in habeas
corpus entertained as one for injunctive relief); Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d
32, 34 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. '822 (1952).
4. Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2725.01-.38 (Page 1954). § 2725.01 states:
"Whoever is unlawfully restrained of his liberty or entitled to the custody of
another, of which custody such person is unlawfully deprived, may prosecute
a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment, re-
straint, or deprivation."
5. According to this strict judicial interpretation, relief through habeas
corpus under the Ohio statute is available only when the court that ordered
the petitioner's confinement lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or the
person. In re Edsall, 26 Ohio St. 2d 145, 269 N.E.2d 848 (1971); see Mitchell
v. Cardwell, 24 Ohio St. 2d 30, 262 N.E.2d 862 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
994 (1971). This common law restriction on the availability of habeas corpus
is expressed in OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2725.05 (Page 1954), which states:
If it appears that a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or mag-
istrate, or by virtue of the judgment or order of a court of record,
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Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County rejected this narrow reading
of the statute and held that habeas corpus relief was also available
to state prisoners protesting detention in solitary confinement, which
resulted in forfeiture of "good time"7 and lengthened their incarcera-
tion.
Petitioners, four inmates at a prison facility operated by the City
of Cleveland, had each been sentenced on May 4, 1972, to 6 months
in that institution for having escaped in February 1972, while await-
ing trial on other charges. On May 14, 1972, they were placed in
punitive segregation (solitary confinement) for 12 days as additional
punishment for their escape. Their requests for a hearing on the
issue of this punishment were denied. One of the petitioners was
also placed in punitive segregation for an additional 11 days in June
1972, for exchanging words with a prison officer. Again, no
opportunity for a hearing or notice of the charges against him were
given to the inmate.8 As a result of this punishment, each petitioner
lost good-time credit and thus forfeited the opportunity to benefit
from an automatic reduction of his sentence by one month.9
The Lamb court's expansion of the scope of the habeas corpus
petition to permit an inmate to protest allegedly illegal punitive
segregation is of itself a striking innovation in the field of prisoners'
rights. The decision is also noteworthy for its resolution of two issues
raised by the inmates in support of their petition. First, the court
decided on a question of first impression in Ohio10 that specific ex-
tensive procedural requirements must be met in prison disciplinary
proceedings." Secondly, the court made a unique determination in
and that the court or magistrate had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be allowed. If the jurisdiction appears after the writ is al-
lowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informal-
ity or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
See Freeman v. Maxwell, 4 Ohio St. 2d 4, 5, 210 N.E.2d 885, 886 (1965).
Under this construction, habeas corpus is not available to protest alleged mis-
treatment of a prisoner incarcerated in a state prison, since such allegations
do not attack the jurisdiction of the trial court. Mitchell v. Cardwell, supra
at 30, 262 N.E.2d at 863.
6. 34 Ohio App. 2d 85, 296 N.E.2d 280 (1973).
7. Under OHio Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2967.19 (Page Supp. 1972), a
prisoner not eligible for parole before expiration of a minimum sentence or
term of imprisonment, who has faithfully observed the rules of the institution,
is entitled to a diminution of his minimum sentence. The diminution is called
"good time."
8. 34 Ohio App. 2d at 85-86, 296 N.E.2d at 282-83.
9. Id. at 86, 296 N.E.2d at 283.
10. Id. at 90, 296 N.E.2d at 285.
11. Id. at 93-96, 296 N.E.2d at 286-88.
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ruling that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy is
violated when a prisoner is placed in solitary confinement for having
previously escaped, after a court has already convicted and sentenced
him for that escape. 12
The most significant result of the holding in Lamb is the expan-
sion of the classes of custodial restraint that can be attacked under
the Ohio writ to include solitary confinement imposed as a prison
disciplinary measure. This expansion compares with the evolution
that has taken place with respect to the federal writ of habeas corpus.
Under federal law, the concept of custody has been broadened to
include -not only confinement in an institution'3 but also restraints
enforced during confinement, such as the conditions imposed on a
parolee's liberty.' 4 This expansion has been accomplished through
numerous breaks with the rules of tradition. For example, the
requirement that petitioner be confined at the time of final disposi-
tion of his petition has been replaced by a rule requiring confinement
only at the time of the filing of the petition.' 5 Similarly, the require-
ment that petitioner seek release from some form of present restraint
has been abolished. 16 More recently, the United States Supreme
Court has held that any claim filed by a prisoner challenging either
the fact or duration of his incarceration and seeking more speedy or
immediate release would be cognizable under federal habeas cor-
pus.' 7
12. Id. at 96-98, 296 N.E.2d at 289.
13. Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1885).
14. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
15. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), overruling Parker v. Ellis,
362 U.S. 574 (1960) (Parker had required confinement at the time the peti-
tion was decided to prevent its dismissal for mootness). In contrast to federal
law, the general rule in Ohio has been to dismiss a petition for habeas corpus
as moot when petitioner is not in confinement at the time of the hearing on
the petition. In re Popp, 35 Ohio St. 2d 142, 298 N.E.2d 529 (1973). The
rule is based upon the proposition that relief under habeas corpus is restricted
to release from present restraint and the issuance or refusal to grant the writ
must affect the petitioner's freedom of movement. Id. at 145, 298 N.E.2d at
531; see Page v. Green, 174 Ohio St. 178, 187 N.E.2d 592 (1963). However,
Ohio law has recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine when the issue
is of public or great general interest. See Wallace v. University Hosps.,
171 Ohio St. 487, 172 N.E.2d 459 (1961). This "public interest" ex-
ception was impliedly invoked in Lamb to avoid dismissal of the habeas corpus
petition. See 34 Ohio App. 2d at 98 n.6, 296 N.E.2d at 289 n.6.
16. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), held that habeas corpus was
properly invoked to challenge the second of two consecutive sentences being
served, although the relief sought would not result in immediate release.
17. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). An exhaustive analysis
of the evolution of "custody" is contained in Developments, supra note 1, at
1045-66.
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In parallel with its development of the concept of custody, the
Supreme Court also moved away from the notion that habeas corpus
only put in issue the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.'8 Initially,
the Court made an effort to bring the new situations being covered
by the writ within the concept of lack of jurisdiction. 19 However,
as the scope of the writ was extended to take cognizance of violations
of the double jeopardy clause,20 convictions under unconstitutional
statutes, 21 and convictions without proper grand jury indictment 22 it
became impossible to insist that jurisdiction was really the issue.
Eventually the fiction of an all-embracing lack-of-jurisdiction ration-
ale was completely abandoned, 23 and federal habeas corpus was
frankly held to be available for the consideration of certain constitu-
tional claims as well as jurisdictional questions.24 A further expan-
sion of the scope of the federal writ occurred in Brown v. Allen, 25
where the Court held that all federal constitutional questions raised
by state petitioners could be determined in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding, notwithstanding a prior full and fair consideration of
those claims by the state judiciary. 26
In contrast to this development of federal habeas corpus, judicial
interpretation of the Ohio habeas corpus statute27 has not resulted
in broad availability of the writ. Historically the writ was available
in Ohio only when the petitioner had been convicted or sentenced
by a court lacking jurisdiction over his person or the subject matter
18. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-03 (1830).
19. Developments, supra note 1, at 1054.
20. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
21. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1873).
22. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885). Other bases for granting the
writ include: confinement to the wrong institution, In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242
(1894); violation of the right to a fair trial, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(19,23); violation of the right to counsel, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938).
23. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
24. See Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944), and House v. Mayo, 324
U.S. 42 (1945), both of which authorized review under habeas corpus of fed-
eral claims by state prisoners, where state review was either inadequate or un-
available and direct federal review was unavailable.
25. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
26. In Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), the Court held
that federal constitutional claims could also be litigated in a proceeding under
28 U.S.C. '§ 2255 (1970), the postconviction remedy for federal prisoners that
is equivalent to a habeas corpus proceeding. A thorough review of the various
rationales authorizing relief under federal habeas corpus can be found in De-
velopments, supra note 1, at 1072-93.
27. See note 4 supra.
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of the offense28 and was seeking release from present confinement.29
Recently, however, the expansion of federal habeas corpus to ensure
an opportunity to collaterally attack a conviction obtained in violation
of certain constitutional rights30 was mirrored in a similar expansion
of the Ohio writ,3 1 probably because of the state judiciary's desire
to use the "exhaustion of state remedy" rule3 2 to determine constitu-
tional claims of state prisoners initially in state courts. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, in Knox v.
Maxwell33 , enunciated this modification of Ohio habeas corpus in
holding that those constitutional claims allowable under the habeas
corpus statute were limited to claims of error neither within the
prisoner's knowledge nor of a nature that the prisoner should have
discovered and raised them during trial or appeal;3 4 claims of denial
of constitutional rights that were reasonably within the petitioner's
knowledge or easily discoverable at the time of trial could not be
collaterally attacked by habeas corpus.3 5
28. In re Burson, 152 Ohio St. 375, 89 N.E.2d 651 (1949); Burns v. Tar-
box, 76 Ohio St. 520, 81 N.E. 761 (1907); Ex parte Van Hagan, 25 Ohio St.
426 (1874).
29. Ball v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 39, 201 N.E.2d 786 (1964); Page v.
Green, 174 Ohio St. 178, 187 N.E.2d 592 (1963).
30. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text.
31. Freeman v. Maxwell, 4 Ohio St. 2d 4, 5-6, 210 N.E.2d 885, 886
(1965).
32. In Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116-17 (1944), the Court enunciated
the "exhaustion of state remedies" rule, under which an application for federal
habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has ex-
hausted the remedies available to him in the state courts, or that there is either
an absence of available state corrective process or the existence of circum-
stances rendering such process ineffective to protect the petitioner's rights.
This rule is now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970):
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies avail-
able to him in the state courts, or that there is either an absence of
available state corrective process or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the pris-
oner.
33. 277 F. Supp. 593, 596-97 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
34. E.g., Johnson v. State, 177 Ohio St. 37, 201 N.E.2d 602 (1964) (al-
leged deprivation of counsel); Poe v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 28, 201 N.E.2d
703 (1964) (alleged illegal conviction because of lack of arrest and search war-
rants).
35. E.g., Cook v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 18, 201 N.E.2d 597 (1964)
(claims of innocence and that court admitted evidence of incompetent wit-
nesses must be raised on appeal); Tinsley v. Maxwell, 176 Ohio St. 185, 198
N.E.2d 673 (1964) (improper denial of transcript for appeal must be raised
on appeal and not in habeas corpus). Whether such a clearly defined standard
[Vol. 25:684
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This expansion of the scope of the writ led to a dramatic increase
in the volume of petitions and proceedings and caused the Ohio
legislature to devise an alternative remedy to habeas corpus.3 6 In
1965, it enacted the Ohio Post-Conviction Act,37 which applied to
all constitutionally based collateral attacks on the validity of judg-
ments of conviction.
This legislation channelled the bulk of habeas corpus petitions in-
to the new post-conviction relief procedure and placed the Ohio
Supreme Court in a position to return habeas corpus to its original
narrow role of protesting lack of jurisdiction.3 8 Recent decisions,
moreover, indicate that the court continues to view the writ as being
so restricted.3 9 In re Lamb, therefore, represents a radical departure
to determine availability of the writ really existed is open to doubt. See 26
Onro ST. LJ. 496 (1965).
36. See Freeman v. Maxwell, 4 Ohio St. 2d 4, 6, 210 N.E.2d 885, 886-
87 (1965).
37. OHo RaV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.21-.24 (Page Supp. 1972). These sec-
tions provide that a prisoner claiming a right to be released from custody on
the ground that there was a denial or infringement of his rights that rendered
his conviction void or voidable under the state or federal constitutions may file
a petition in the court that imposed sentence for the purpose of vacating or
setting aside his sentence. However, under State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St. 2d 175,
226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), if the court that renders judgment of conviction has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and person, the doctrine of res judicata will
be applied in determining whether postconviction relief is available. The re-
sulting rule is that a final judgment bars relitigation, except on appeal, of any
defense or claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been
raised at the trial or on appeal. Id. at 180, 226 N.E.2d at 108. The issues
of inadequacy or lack of counsel are not so barred. State v. Juliano, 24 Ohio
St. 2d 117, 120, 265 N.E.2d 290, 293 (1970).
38. Freeman v. Maxwell, 4 Ohio St. 2d 4, 6, 210 N.E.2d 885, 886-87
(1965).
39. See, e.g., In re Edsall, 26 Ohio St. 2d 145, 269 N.E.2d 848 (1971);
Mitchell v. Cardwell, 24 Ohio St. 2d 30, 262 N.E.2d 862 (1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 994 (1971). However, in In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313
N.E.2d 851 (1974), the Ohio Supreme Court allowed the use of habeas corpus
to protest an alleged lack of due process in civil hearings resulting in commit-
ment of petitioners to a state mental institution, although the petition did not
attack the jurisdiction of the probate court, which had ordered their commit-
ment The primary holding of the case is that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires that persons subject to involuntary civil com-
mitment proceedings are entitled to be represented by counsel. Relying upon
prior United States Supreme Court decisions, the court stated that relief in ha-
beas corpus must lie where it is the only adequate state remedy available by
which inmates in mental institutions may raise claims of denial of federal
rights, such as their right to representation by counsel at their commitment
hearings. Therefore, the court allowed a petition for habeas corpus attacking
the probate court's judgment as void because of a denial of federal constitu-
tional rights during the proceedings resulting in the judgment, rather than be-
19751
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from the existing Ohio law. It permits habeas corpus to be used
by prisoners to protest their treatment, even though an allegation of
wrongful confinement in punitive segregation by prison officials has
nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the trial court.40
In the past, courts seldom sanctioned such a broad use of the
writ. Even in the federal courts, which were expanding the applica-
bility of habeas corpus, use of the writ to attack conditions of incar-
ceration was disallowed on the ground that such a complaint did not
attack the legality of confinement. 41 However, inroads into the
general policy of limiting the use of the writ to questions dealing with
legality of confinement were initiated by Coffin v. Reichard,42 in
which the scope of federal habeas corpus was expanded to include
petitions protesting the conditions of confinement or manner of treat-
ment. In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that the writ was available to a prisoner when-
ever he was deprived of some right to which he was entitled, even
though lawfully confined, if the deprivation of that right served
to make his imprisonment more burdensome than the law allowed
or if it served to restrict his liberty illegally.43 The court reasoned
that a prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except
those expressly taken from him by law or by necessary implication
and that these rights should be diligently protected through habeas
corpus, even though the petitioner may, in fact, be legally incar-
cerated.4 4  Although Coffin received sparse approval in other
courts, 4 5 its influence is manifest in Lamb.46
cause of a lack of jurisdiction as is required under the common law. See id.
at 73-75, 313 N.E.2d at 854. It might be argued that habeas corpus must simi-
larly be available to prisoners in penal institutions who wish to assert claims
of denial of their federal right to procedural due process during prison disci-
plinary hearings, as recently established in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974), although such petitions would attack neither the jurisdiction nor judg-
ment of the court that had originally sentenced the petitioners. The develop-
ment of an adequate state forum for resolution of prisoners' claims of depriva-
tion of federal constitutional rights during disciplinary proceedings would seem
advantageous to the state, permitting initial determination of those claims by
state courts. See notes 56-60 infra and accompanying text.
40. Mitchell v. Cardwell, 24 Ohio St. 2d 30, 262 N.E.2d 862 (1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
41. E.g., Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 818 (3d Cir. 1968); Robert v. Peg-
elow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963); Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32, 34 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952).
42. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
43. Id. at 445.
44. Id.
45. Coffin was accepted in Coonts v. Wainwright, 282 F. Supp. 893, 894
(M.D. Fla. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1969), and in Thompson
v. Cavell, 158 F. Supp. 19, 21 (W.D. Pa. 1957), but in other federal circuits
[Vol. 25:684
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The United States Supreme Court has adopted the expanded
scope of federal habeas corpus proposed in Coffin. In Johnson v.
Avery,47 the Court impliedly sanctioned the use of habeas corpus to
secure release from solitary confinement, although the procedure was
not specifically discussed in the opinion of the Court. Two years
later, in Wilwording v. Swenson,48 the Court made it clear that
Johnson would allow a prisoner's petition to challenge his living con-
ditions and the disciplinary measures imposed upon him under a
federal writ of habeas corpus. 49 This explicit affirmation of Johnson
appeared to approve the Coffin rule for federal habeas corpus. 50 In
contrast, there has been only a scattered acceptance of Coffin by the
states.
51
Despite the availability of federal habeas corpus to challenge
prison disciplinary procedures, state prisoners have typically pre-
ferred to raise their challenges by proceeding under 42 U.S.C. section
1983.52 Section 1983 is used to assert a variety of prisoners' rights
habeas corpus has been restricted to the traditional petition for release from
allegedly invalid custody under sentence. Developments, supra note 1, at 1085.
46. 34 Ohio App. 2d at 87, 296 N.E.2d at 283.
47. 393 U.S. 483 (1969). In Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 793 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966), the court relied on Coffin and released a prisoner from solitary
confinement under a writ of habeas corpus when it found that the petitioner
had been placed in solitary confinement for violating an unconstitutional
prison regulation. It characterized solitary confinement as "a jail within a
jail." Id. at 787. The case was reversed on appeal, 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir.
1967), but the Supreme Court upheld the district court's use of habeas corpus
and its finding that the regulation was unconstitutional. 393 U.S. 483 (1969),
rev'g 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967).
48. 404 U.S. 249 (1971).
49. Id. at 251.
50. See, e.g., Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1973); Mead
v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1972); Armstrong v. Cardwell, 457 F.2d
34 (6th Cir. 1972); Walters v. Henderson, 352 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
51. Cases in which habeas corpus has been used to protest treatment of
prisoners have most often dealt with petitions alleging violations of the consti-
tutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. E.g., In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d
848, 372 P.2d 304, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 914 (1962); Ma-
haffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 392 P.2d 279 (1964); Commonwealth ex rel.
Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971). Other grievances have
been redressed on occasion. E.g., In re Cathey, 55 Cal. 2d 679, 361 P.2d 426,
12 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1961) (mistreatment by prison authorities); In re Ferguson,
55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864
(1961) (denial of freedom of religion). However, one jurisdiction has broadly
defined the scope of the writ and allows its use to challenge any further re-
straint in excess of that authorized by judgment of conviction or by constitu--
tional protections. People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174
N.E.2d 725, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
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including freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, 53 the right to
due process in disciplinary hearings,54 and the right to good-time
credit.55 The relief sought under section 1983 can take the form
of damages56 or an equitable remedy, such as an injunction to restore
good time.57 Relief may also take the form of mandamus and
declaratory judgment. 58
The primary advantage of using section 1983 is that the exhaus-
tion of state remedies rule does not apply.59 A prisoner, therefore,
can obtain a federal court ruling on his claim without having to wait
for the initial resolution by a state court. A second advantage of
the section 1983 route lies in the availability of normal discovery
devices, 60 which are not generally available under habeas corpus.61
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has limited the ability of
the federal judiciary to hear federal constitutional issues that arise
out of state prison disciplinary action when they are raised in section
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
53. E.g., Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.RJ. 1970).
54. E.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
55. E.g., Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
Other rights observable under § 1983 include the right of access to the courts,
the right to freedom of religion, and the right to equal protection of the laws.
See generally, H. KEanRz & J. KERPER, LEGAL P R -rs oF THE CoNvicrED 357-
79 (1974).
56. Liability for damages under § 1983 must be satisfied out of the individ-
ual defendant's pocket, since the eleventh amendment bars a fine upon the state
treasury without its consent for tortious conduct of state prison officials. See
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1971).
57. E.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
58. I KEPER & J. KEEPER, LEGAL RIGhTS oF THE CoNvICTEm 368-69
(1974).
59. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
60. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 496 (1973).
61. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 292-98 (1969). In spite of the ob-
vious advantages of § 1983, use of the provision does have one severe disad-
vantage when compared to a petition for habeas corpus. Proceedings under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) are not given priority on a court's docket, and thus
a petitioner suffers essentially the same delays in coming to trial as those asso-
ciated with civil suits. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 495-96 (1973). In
federal habeas corpus cases, on the other hand, a hearing must be held within
8 days after the petition is filed unless good cause for allowing additional time
is shown. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
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1983 proceedings. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 2 where prisoners were
protesting the loss of good-time credits taken away for prison dis-
ciplinary reasons, the Court held that a claim of a state prisoner chal-
lenging the fact or duration of his confinement and seeking an
immediate or a more speedy release can only be filed under a peti-
tion for federal habeas corpus and is not cognizable in a section 1983
action.63 The consequence of declaring such challenges to be cogniz-
able only under habeas corpus is to bring these cases within the rule
requiring exhaustion of state remedies. 64 Such cases, therefore, can
no longer be brought under section 1983, where the exhaustion
doctrine does not apply.0 5 Thus, if the Ohio Supreme Court should
adopt the appellate court's ruling in Lamb, which transforms Ohio
habeas corpus into a state remedy available to prisoners challenging
solitary confinement and the resulting loss of good time, the exhaus-
tion doctrine would permit the Ohio judiciary to make initial
determination of federal constitutional claims in those cases con-
trolled by Preiser.
Under federal law a state prisoner can effect compliance with the
exhaustion of state remedies in one of three ways: he can prove that
he has exhausted the remedies available to him in the Ohio courts;
he can demonstrate an absence of available state corrective process;
or he can show the presence of circumstances that render the process
ineffective to protect his rights. 60 In Ohio, the statutory scheme for
post-conviction relief is composed of habeas corpus, 67 the Post-Con-
viction Act, 68 the normal appeal remedy, 69 and the delayed appeal
62. 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Rodriguez, Katzoff, and Kritsky, respondents,
were participants in a New York program under which they could earn reduc-
tions in their maximum prison sentence terms through good behavior. These
reductions could be withdrawn in full or in part for bad behavior or for viola-
tion of prison rules. Each respondent had been charged with bad behavior and
as a result lost good-time credit and was placed in solitary confinement. Id.
at 478, 480, 481. Each filed suit under § 1983 and a petition for habeas
corpus in federal district court, alleging denial of due process by the summary.
deprivation of good-time credit by prison officials. The district courts ordered
restoration of good-time credit. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit consolidated the three cases and affirmed. Id. at 482. The Supreme
Court reversed. Id. at 500.
63. Id. at 489. The Court suggested that the rule fashioned was an exten-
sion of Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), which held that a prisoner may
use habeas corpus to attack the second of two consecutive sentences while still
serving the first.
64. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
66. Knox v. Maxwell, 277 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
67. Omro Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 2725.01-.28 (Page 1954).
68. Omo RV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.21-.24 (Page Supp. 1972).
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remedy.70 The latter three remedies are designed only to permit a
challenge of the validity of the prisoner's conviction and, therefore,
are not available to a prisoner attacking the constitutionality of prison
disciplinary action or alleging mistreatment. Since prior to Lamb the
use of habeas corpus was limited by the Ohio cases to the narrow
function of attacking the jurisdiction of the trial court, 71 it too was
unavailable to challenge disciplinary action against the prisoner.
Thus, all four of Ohio's post-conviction remedies were inadequate
and ineffective for the end sought, leaving the prisoner free to seek
relief under federal habeas corpus without pursuing any state
remedies whatsoever. 72
However, if Ohio were to accept the Lamb decision and permit
the use of habeas corpus to protest disciplinary action, under the ex-
haustion of state remedies rule those claims in which prisoners
challenged the fact or duration of confinement and sought immediate
release or a speedier release would have to be litigated in Ohio courts
before federal habeas corpus proceedings were commenced. This
would give the Ohio judiciary the initial opportunity to hear the case,
which without Lamb, would not otherwise be possible. Since ques-
tions of jurisdiction are not merely procedural questions but ques-
tions of power between the states and federal government, 73 the
significance of Ohio's obtaining jurisdiction over these cases becomes
apparent. ,First, state judges presumably would ensure that their
determinations of the constitutionality of state prison disciplinary pro-
cedures would be made only after full and sympathetic consideration
of the problems facing prison administrators, as well as their need
to exercise broad discretion in regulating prison life. Secondly, in
subsequent federal habeas corpus proceedings the federal court
would probably give great weight to prior state court resolution of
federal constitutional issues,74 even though the doctrine of res
judicata is not wholly applicable.1 5 Finally, should the prisoner file
69. Id. § 2953.05.
70. Id.
71. See notes 28-29, 38-39, supra and accompanying text.
72. Cf. Knox v. Maxwell, 277 F. Supp. 593, 600 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
73. C. WRiGHT, HANDBooK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CourTs 1-2 (2d ed.
1970).
74. See Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87
HARv. L. REv. 321, 349-52 (1973).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970):
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application
for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the
merits of a factual issue, made by a state court of competent juris-
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a section 1983 action for damages arising out of the same disciplinary
proceedings which prompted the petition for habeas corpus, 76 the
prior state court resolution of federal constitutional issues would be
determinative in the section 1983 proceedings, under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.77
diction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the
State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a writ-
ten finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written
indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall es-
tablish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved
in the State court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State-
court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at
the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject
matter or over the person of the applicant in the State court pro-
ceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court,
in deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint coun-
sel to represent him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and ade-
quate hearing in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of
law in the State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court pro-
ceeding in which the determination of such factual issue was
made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support such factual determination, is produced as pro-
vided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration
of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual
determination is not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court,
when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless
the existence of one or more of the circumstances respectively set
forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the
applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or un-
less the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph num-
bered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered
as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the
burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evi-
dence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970), under which the federal court may dispose of
the application for a writ of habeas corpus "as law and justice require." See
also Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 497 (1973); Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 312-18 (1963).
76. See 411 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, Douglas & Marshall, J1., dissenting).
77. Collateral estoppel refers to the effect of a judgment as a bar or es-
toppel against the prosecution of a second action between the same par-
ties upon a different claim or cause of action than the one upon which
the judgment was entered. The judgment in the prior action, if rendered
upon the merits, operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or
points controverted that were actually litigated in the prior action. See Crom-
well v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876). Under this doctrine, state
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Assuming Lamb's interpretation of the habeas corpus statute
became Ohio law, the extent to which the writ would have to be
sought under the exhaustion rule prior to commencement of a federal
habeas corpus action, would be influenced by the rule established in
Preiser.78 Although Preiser appears to be subject to broader inter-
pretations covering a range of cases beyond its facts,79 it has recently
been narrowly construed by the Court in Wolff v. McDonnell.80 In
Wolff a Nebraska prisoner filed a class action under section 1983
alleging that disciplinary proceedings violated due process and that
the inmate legal assistance program and prison mail regulations failed
to satisfy constitutional standards. In his claim against the disci-
plinary procedures, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief both to
compel prison officials to restore good time lost through disciplinary
proceedings, and to require prison officials to submit to the court a
plan for disciplinary procedures that would satisfy due process.
Plaintiff also sought damages for deprivation of his civil rights in the
allegedly unconstitutional proceedings."' The Court held that under
court resolution of constitutional issues in state habeas corpus proceedings
would be binding in subsequent federal proceedings under § 1983. See 411
U.S. at 511.
78. See 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
79. Preiser had the potential to be expanded by later decisions into a rule
that would cover a broad range of prisoner complaints. First, interpretation
of prisoner complaints seeking release from conditions of confinement, such
as solitary confinement, as seeking release from the "fact of confinement"
would make such cases subject to the exhaustion of remedies rule and to refer-
ral to state courts, when appropriate, for initial resolution. In this respect, the
Court has noted the possibility that habeas corpus could lie to remove any ad-
ditional and unconstitutional restraints imposed during otherwise lawful cus-
tody. 411 U.S. at 499. Secondly, interpretation of § 1983 suits for declara-
tory judgments against the constitutionality of disciplinary procedures under
which good time was lost as challenges to the duration of confinement that
"seek" immediate or more speedy release would bring such cases under Preiser.
Such expansive readings of Preiser, which multiply the initial opportunities
for state courts to resolve questions arising from the administration of state
prisons, would not have been surprising in view of the evident sentiment on
the Court in favor of greater protection of states' interests in regulation of their
prisons. The Court has emphasized the need for promoting federal-state com-
ity, not only by preventing the federal judiciary from interfering in state court
affairs before those courts had an opportunity to correct their constitutional
errors, but also by curtailing interference in state administrative affairs. 411
U.S. at 491-92, 497. In fact, the Court has viewed the state administration
of its prisons as an activity in which states have the strongest of interests and
as an area in which the states should be given the first opportunity to correct
errors made in internal administration. 411 U.S. at 491-92.
80. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
81. Id. at 553.
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Preiser only an injunction restoring good time was foreclosed in a
section 1983 proceeding and that damages, declaratory relief, and
other injunctive relief for improper revocation of good time were
available.8
As a result of Wolff, the rule in Preiser now governs only prisoner
complaints challenging the fact or duration of confinement and seek-
ig an injunction compelling either immediate release or restoration
of good time.83 Accordingly, in such cases Ohio habeas corpus (as
transformed by Lamb) would constitute a mandatory state remedy.
If the petitioner were to forgo seeking an injunction, however, he
could bypass state court by instituting a federal action under section
1983.
Thus, to guarantee the initial resolution of his constitutional
claims in a federal forum while escaping the rule in Preiser, a state
prisoner need only seek a section 1983 declaratory judgment that the
disciplinary procedures imposed upon him are unconstitutional.
Since there is no requirement to exhaust state remedies when seeking
such declaratory relief,8 4 the petitioner is not required to litigate the
issue initially in the state court. He must be careful to refrain from
praying for an injunction to compel release or restoration of good
time, however, since such an action would be cognizable only under
a writ of habeas corpus,85 which demands that the petitioner first liti-
gate the matter in state court. Should the petitioner obtain a section
1983 declaratory judgment, he can then achieve the actual restora-
tion of good time by using the federal judgment to obtain a
mandatory injunction in state court under the doctrine of res judicata,
as emphasized by the Court in Wolff.88 In addition, the prisoner
can also recover damages in the section 1983 proceeding and secure
an injunction against the prospective enforcement of any disciplinary
procedures declared invalid.8 7
Yet, in spite of the ease with which a state prisoner could secure
initial determination of his federal constitutional claims in a federal
court, a prisoner may still prefer to seek relief from an Ohio court
under the state writ of habeas corpus. First, his petition would be
heard faster than a section 1983 proceeding would be litigated.88
82. Id. at 554-55.
83. Id. at 557-58.
84. Id. at 554-55.
85. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
86. 418 U.S. at 554 & n.12.
87. Id. at 554-55.
88. Omo REv. COD ANN. § 2725.06 (Page 1954) provides that when a
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Secondly, a state court might be just as favorable a forum in which
to argue his constitutional claims as a federal district court.8 9 There-
fore, should Lamb's expansive interpretation of the Ohio writ become
state law, it would encourage substantial litigation under the Ohio
habeas corpus statute and provide ample opportunity for Ohio courts
to consider the interplay of procedural due process and administra-
tion of discipline in penal institutions.
Taken together, Wolff's constriction of Preiser and Lamb's
expansion of Ohio habeas corpus set up a procedural pattern that
funnels a variety of prisoners' claims into the Ohio state courts for
initial determination. However, at the same time that the Supreme
Court passed this initiative to the states, it also read the due process
rights of prisoners narrowly.9 0 Thus, in effect, the Court limited the
role of state courts to defining more precisely the principles set forth
in its ruling on the substantive claim in Wolff. Ironically, the Court's
new formulation probably cannot be reconciled with the broad due
process protections extended to prisoners in Lamb.
But for Wolff, Lamb would be valuable Ohio precedent for the
guarantee of procedural due process rights in the arena of state
prison disciplinary proceedings. The Ohio court of appeals held that
the following safeguards must be afforded a prisoner faced with the
possibility of punitive segregation: (1) an impartial factfinder and
decisionmaker at the proceeding; (2) written notice specifying the
prison rule allegedly broken, including a statement of facts upon
which the charge is based; (3) written notice of the prison rules
given before the time of the incident in question; (4) the right to
explain his conduct and relevant circumstances; (5) the right to
present real and testimonial evidence within reasonable limits; (6)
the right to reasonable confrontation and cross-examination of
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is presented, if it appears that the writ
ought to issue, a court or judge authorized to grant the writ must grant it forth-
with and set a time and date for a hearing in accordance with § 2725.09. A
court typically has a discretionary power to dispose of habeas corpus cases in
advance of the order in which they are entered on the docket. E.g., Omo Rv.
CODE ANN. § 2501.09(A) (Page 1954). By contrast, § 1983 proceedings are
not given priority on a docket. See note 61 supra.
89. The Lamb court, for example, could certainly be characterized as sym-
pathetic to the federal constitutional rights of state prisoners, in view of the
expansion of habeas corpus to facilitate a prisoner's quest for relief from oner-
ous disciplinary treatment. Further, the procedural due process requirements
imposed by the court seem to give more protection to a prisoner than those
later laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Wolff. See notes 103-
09 infra and accompanying text.
90. See text accompanying notes 97-102 infra.
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adverse witnesses; and (7) a written decision based solely upon sub-
stantial evidence presented at the hearing, stating the reasons for the
decision and describing the evidence upon which it was based.91
The resolution of the conflict between affording the protection
of due process to state prisoners and maintaining expedient prison
discipline was an issue of first impression in Ohio courts. 92 The court
expressed two reasons for its decision to rule upon the issue in this
case, even though it entailed advancing a concept of habeas corpus
at variance with the traditional nature of the writ under Ohio law.
The first rationale offered was that of continuing responsibility of the
state courts to protect the basic rights of individuals placed in prison
as a result of sentences imposed by those courts. 93  Secondly, the
court expressed a belief in preserving the balance of federal-state
relations in the administration of the national system of criminal jus-
tice by assuming responsibility for the delineation of prisoners' rights
in state custodial institutions. 94  Although not discussed in the
opinion, the apparent willingness of Ohio federal courts to consider
the constitutional claims of state prisoners under federal habeas
corpus probably spurred the state court to take the initiative in defin-
ing the role of procedural due process in state penal institutions.95
The due process protection afforded a prisoner by Lamb, how-
ever, appears to have been substantially reduced by Wolff v. McDon-
nell,96 a decision that climaxed a growing trend among lower federal
91. 34 Ohio App. 2d at 94-96, 296 N.E.2d at 287-88.
92. Id. at 90, 296 N.E.2d at 285.
93. Id. at 89-90, 296 N.E.2d at 285.
94. Id. at 90, 296 N.E.2d at 285.
95. In Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub
nor. Jones v. Metzgar, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972), filed under § 1983, the
district court ordered extensive changes in the administration of a state penal
institution. The court indicated that, on facts similar to those in Lamb, it
would have invalidated the prison's policy of imposing punitive segregation on
escapees who had already been sentenced for that escape. The court stated
that the discipline imposed must have no relationship to the acts that led to
the prisoner's incarceration and must be directly related to the prison rule vio-
lated. Id. at 720. The district court's innovative action was affirmed. 456
F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), has also held that a state
prisoner's claim based on alleged mistreatment was cognizable under federal
habeas corpus. Armstrong v. Cardwell, 457 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1972). These
decisions may have convinced the Lamb court of the need to develop an ade-
quate state means to litigate constitutional issues arising from the internal ad-
ministration of state penal institutions. See 34 Ohio App. 2d at 90, 296 N.E.
2d at 285.
96, See notes 80-87 supra and accompanying text.
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courts to intervene in the administration of state prison discipline.97
In balancing the interests of prisoners against those interests unique
97. Until recently federal courts have been reluctant to venture into the
area of disciplinary proceedings in penal institutions. Several rationales were
typically offered to support this policy of nonintervention, called the "hands-
off doctrine": First, a desire not to upset a delicate balance in preserving fed-
eral-state comity, e.g., Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); second, a belief that prison disciplinary matters
were exercised in the discretion of executive officials and should not be subject
to judicial review unless the punishment was so unreasonable as to be cruel,
e.g., Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963); third, dicta in Price
v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948), stated that lawful incarceration neces-
sarily limits many rights normally enjoyed by a free citizen; and finally, that
many matters of concern to prisoners, such as parole, were mere privileges,
not rights, which were not attended by constitutional safeguards, e.g., Ugh-
banks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1908). See generally Note, Be-
yond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
Both the hands-off doctrine as a whole and the right-privilege distinction
had been eroded as constitutional barriers to judicial intervention into prison
affairs prior to Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). In Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), the Court had emphasized that state administra-
tion of prisons is subject to federal authority when paramount federal rights su-
pervene and that state prison regulations may be invalidated when they conflict
with these rights. And in Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971), the
Court had approved judicial review of claims by state prisoners challenging dis-
ciplinary measures taken against them. The Court had similarly undercut the
right-privilege distinction as justification for denying procedural due process
safeguards in various types of administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (discharge of a tenured professor); Mor-
risey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits). See generally Van Al-
styne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
An increasing number of lower federal courts rejected the hands-off doc-
trine. The initial decisions upholding the right to procedural safeguards in
prison disciplinary proceedings occurred in suits under § 1983. E.g., Landman
v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328
F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). These courts decided that the interests of sentenced inmates
in remaining free from segregated detention and in retaining good time were
substantial enough to warrant due process protection. Intervention by federal
courts has followed after these first examples. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973); Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F.
Supp. 105 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D.
Fla. 1973). However, not all federal courts were so ready to abandon the
hands-off doctrine. See, e.g., Eisenhardt v. Britton, 478 F.2d 855 (5th Cir.
1973); Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1062 (1972); Poindexter v. Woodson, 357 F. Supp. 443 (D. Kan. 1973). The
success of the initial decisions resulted in a large number of similar suits. A to-
tal of 3600 civil rights actions were filed" in 1972, compared to 233 in 1966.
See DIRECTOR, ADMIINISTRATIVE OFFICE, UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL RE-
PORT 117, table 19 (1972).
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to the administration of penal institutions, the Wolff Court held that
disciplinary proceedings to determine serious misconduct that could
warrant forfeiture of good time or the imposition of solitary confine-
ment must meet certain minimal due process requirements. These
requirements include (1) advance written notice to the inmate not
less than 24 hours before any hearing;98 (2) a written statement by
the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for any
disciplinary action taken;99 (3) the right of an inmate to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence, subject to determina-
tion by officials that such action would not jeopardize institutional
security or goals; 100 and (4) a qualified right to substitute counsel.10'
At the same time, however, the Court held that several safe-
guards, which had been recognized by the Lamb court, were not con-
stitutionally required. For example, the Supreme Court assumed a
position wholly contradictory to that taken by Lamb by holding that
an inmate has no constitutional right to cross-examine and confront
adverse witnesses.' 02 The Ohio court, while noting the possibility
that permitting cross-examination of prison guards or inmate inform-
ants could dilute the authoritarian status of guards or cause friction
among prisoners, found the constitutional right to reasonable and
relevant cross-examination to be superior to administrative con-
cerns. 10 3 The United States Supreme Court, however, in its balanc-
ing of a prisoner's need for constitutional safeguards against institu-
tional needs, held that prisoners do not possess this fundamental
right. The Court cited the potential for prison disruption that would
attend recognition of the cross-examination right in prisoners as justi-
fication for this position. 04 The Court entrusted to the discretion
of the prison authorities decisions regarding the allowance of cross-
examination of adverse witnesses by prisoners. 0 5 Thus, the Court
impliedly rejected the assertion in Lamb that fairness of disciplinary
proceedings would be fundamentally destroyed if prisoners were
denied the right to cross-examination. 1 6
In similar fashion the Court subordinated a prisoner's constitu-
tional right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in
98. 418 U.S. at 564.
99. Id. at 564-65.
100. Id. at 566-67.
101. Id. at 570.
102. Id. at 567-68.
103. 34 Ohio App. 2d at 95, 296 N.E.2d at 288.
104. 418 U.S. at 568.
105. Id. at 569.
106. Id. at 568.
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his defense to the exercise of official discretion. 107  Under Wolff
prison authorities may refuse to call witnesses requested by a prisoner
and may otherwise limit his ability to collect evidence for his defense
when they feel it would create a risk of reprisal or undermine official
authority. 10 8  In contrast, Lamb had subjected a prisoner's right to
present evidence only to traditional limits of reasonableness as to
amount and relevance. 109
The potential of Lamb as a "bellwether"' " for an expansion of
prisoners' rights in Ohio has thus been diluted by Wolff v. McDon-
nell. Notwithstanding that most prison disciplinary cases turn on
issues of fact,"' the Supreme Court denies a prisoner accused of mis-
conduct the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers or
witnesses, whose memory may be faulty or whose testimony may be
perjured or motivated by malice, vindictiveness, prejudice, or jeal-
ousy." 2 Instead, his ability to present an effective defense is at the
mercy of the discretion of prison authorities. In view of the Court's
obvious preference to defer to administrative discretion in judging the
fairness of disciplinary proceedings, in many such proceedings the
exercise of that discretion will render an inmate unable to present
any defense to the allegations of his accusers. As Mr. Justice
Marshall stated in dissent in Wolff:
Without these procedures [confrontation and cross-exam-
ination], a disciplinary board cannot resolve disputed fac-
tual issues in any rational or accurate way. The hearing
will thus amount to little more than a swearing contest,
with each side telling its version of the facts-and, indeed,
with only the prisoner's story subject to being tested by
107. 418 U.S. at 566.
108. Id.
109. 34 Ohio App. 2d at 95, 296 N.E.2d at 288. Wolff does provide one
due process protection beyond those required by Lamb. Under Wolff a pris-
oner has an absolute right to substitute counsel under circumstances dictating
a need for one, 418 U.S. at 570, presumably under a fundamental fairness
standard, as applied in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973) (extend-
ing to probationers the right to preliminary and final revocation hearings under
conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)). Whether
this right will effectively aid a prisoner in his defense is questionable, since
under Wolff the requirement for substitute counsel may be satisfied by provid-
ing the prisoner with a member of the prison staff or an inmate selected by
the staff, 418 U.S. at 570. Having provided substitute counsel, the authorities
may prohibit aid from any other inmates, regardless of how knowledgeable in
the law they may be. Id. at 577-78.
110. 34 Ohio App. 2d at 80, 296 N.E.2d at 285.
111. 418 U.S. at 595 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 595-96.
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cross-examination. In such a contest, it seems obvious
to me that even the wrongfully charged inmate will in-
variably be -the loser.113
By subordinating the interests of prisoners to the institutional
needs and objectives of prisons, the Court has acted in its capacity
as ultimate arbiter of federal constitutional questions to ensure that
primary control of administration of state prisons remains in the
hands of state officials. This objective having been achieved in
Wolff by resolution of substantive law through the appellate process,
it is now understandable why in the same case the Court restricted
Preiser to its facts." 4 At first glance, the Court's narrow interpre-
tation of Preiser, which makes federal courts more accessible to state
prisoners, suggests that the Court is both encouraging federal court
intervention into state prison disciplinary matters and discouraging
state court jurisdiction over federal constitutional issues arising out
of those matters. Such a policy would seem to contradict the Court's
announced desire to protect the power of a state to control the
administration of its prisons and to provide an opportunity for state
officials to correct internal administrative errors." 5 But it is now
clear that no contradiction of this sort exists, since both federal and
state courts are bound by the procedural due process requirements
set forth in Wolff, which heavily favor state interests and uphold a
strong element of discretion in the administration of prison dis-
ciplinary proceedings. Therefore, the significance of a state pris-
oner's augmented ability to litigate his constitutional claims in federal
court has been weakened by the Court's conservatve shaping of the
procedural due process standards that govern those claims.
Though the strict interpretation of prisoners' rights in Wolff seems
to have vitiated Lamb's potential to be a milestone in the recognition
of Ohio prisoners' due process rights in disciplinary proceedings, it
left to be answered the final question raised by the tripartite holding
in Lamb. For, besides taking a novel stance on the scope of habeas
corpus and the role of procedural due process in prison proceedings,
Lamb also held that a prisoner's constitutional protection from double
jeopardy" 6 is violated when he is placed in punitive segregation as
113. See id. at 582 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114. See notes 79-84 supra and accompanying text.
115. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 491-92, 497-98.
116. The double jeopardy clause is contained in the fifth amendment: "nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The double jeopardy provision
of the fifth amendment was held applicable to the states under the due process
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punishment for having escaped, if he has already been convicted and
sentenced for that escape. 11 It remains to be determined, then,
whether this view of the double jeopardy clause can be squared with
existing case law.
The prohibition on double jeopardy generally forbids (1) retrial
for the same offense after acquittal, 118 (2) retrial for the same
offense after conviction, 1 9 and (3) multiple punishment for the
same offense. 20  The constitutional bar against double jeopardy is
a shield only against "criminal" punishment being imposed in viola-
tion of the bar. In most instances, it prohibits punishment imposed
by a criminal court of law, but may also bar a civil sanction that
is punitive rather than remedial in nature. 12 The Lamb court found
that violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy occurred
when prison officials imposed "double punishment" for the same
offense.' 22 The court reasoned that solitary confinement imposed by
prison authorities is a type of punishment within the purview of the
clause of the fourteenth amendment in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969).
117. The traditional limitations on the use of habeas corpus help to explain
why the double jeopardy question of Lamb (whether being sentenced for an
offense barred later administrative punishment for that offense) had not been
raised previously. Historically the writ could not be used to protest treatment
of the prisoner. Therefore, a prisoner alleging that administrative action taken
against him violated the double jeopardy clause was denied a forum. See note
41 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, the hands-off doctrine probably
discouraged judicial inquiry into the nature of prison discipline under the dou-
ble jeopardy clause. In contrast, the more common double jeopardy issue in-
volving prison discipline (whether punishment administered for an act barred
later prosecution for that offense) was often raised on appeal, e.g., People v.
Eggleston, 255 Cal. App. 2d 337, 63 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1967), or by habeas
corpus, e.g., Gilchrist v. United States, 427 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1970).
118. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); Kepner v. United States,
195 U.S. 100 (1904). Under the common law, such retrial was barred by the
plea of autrefois acquit (formerly acquitted). Comment, Twice in Jeopardy,
75 YALE LJ. 262, 265 n.11 (1965).
119. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). At common law re-
trial was barred by the pleas of autrefois convict (formerly convicted) and
autrefois attaint (formerly attainted). Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE
L.J 262, 265 n.12 (1965).
120. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
121. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397-99 (1938) (holding that the
imposition of a penalty tax in a civil proceeding was an administrative sanction
and therefore not barred by a prior acquittal on criminal charges arising out
of the same conduct that led to the civil proceeding); Murphy v. United States,
272 U.S. 630, 632 (1926).
122. 34 Ohio App. 2d at 97, 296 N.E.2d at 289.
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double jeopardy clause and that when imposed upon the prisoner for
escaping after he has been sentenced by the courts for the same of-
fense, a violation occurs. This reasoning is interesting and will
surely be attempted again in later suits. It is not, however, based
on stable ground.
The Lamb approach to disciplinary punishment is unlike that
usually accepted by the courts. Traditionally, courts have viewed
such punishment as administrative in nature and have consistently
held that the double jeopardy clause will not bar prosecution for the
same acts for which the administrative punishment was imposed,
whether the punishment was solitary confinement 23 or forfeiture of
good time.' 24 The rationale supporting this characterization of
prison discipline is that it is an administrative function of the state
executive and therefore not "criminal punishment" barred by the
double jeopardy clause.' 25
Given the Supreme Court's deference to the discretion of prison
authorities set forth in Wolff,' 26 it is likely that the Supreme Court
would favor the traditional characterization of prison disciplinary
sanctions and thus, in all probability, reject the double jeopardy argu-
ment accepted in Lamb. In Wolff, the Court stressed that its consti-
tutional judgments had to be made against the background found in
many penal institutions today, that of a closed, tightly controlled en-
vironment with an ever present potential to erupt into violence.' 27
The Court perceived prison disciplinary proceedings as the method
by which security and order can be maintained in this environ-
ment,. 28 and viewed a flexible use of official discretion as essential
to maintaining a successful disciplinary program.' 29 The experience
of prison authorities in handling individual inmates is obviously
highly valued by the Court. Depriving officials of the right to use
solitary confinement to deter former escapees from future attempts
to escape would cut directly against the deference shown by the
Court to such administrative decisions. Significantly, in Wolff the
Court emphasized the need to judge the acceptability of disciplinary
procedures in the light of the threat posed by prisoners who have
123. E.g., United States v. Apker, 419 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1969); Patterson
v. United States, 183 F.2d 327 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kimball v.
United States, 340 U.S. 893 (1950).
124. E.g., Gilchrist v. United States, 427 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1970).
125. E.g., United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1971).
126. See notes 96-108 supra and accompanying text.
127. 418 U.S. at 562-63.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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already demonstrated little regard for prison regulations.' 0 Pre-
sumably former escapees are such individuals.
Another argument against applying the double jeopardy clause
to prison disciplinary measures is that these sanctions serve a
remedial, not punitive purpose, and therefore are not criminal
punishment,' 3 ' even when imposed as a result of the nature of the
crime for which the inmate was convicted. Prison discipline is
viewed by the Wolff Court as "a tool to advance the rehabilitative
goals of the institution.' 32 Such goals clearly reflect a remedial
purpose. Thus, it can be argued that prison discipline is neither a
sentence of a criminal court nor a punitive civil sanction, but a
remedial device,'38 which is exempt from application of the double
jeopardy concept.
Finally, assuming such use of solitary confinement is applied uni-
formly to former escapees, the policy would seem to be more
properly viewed as merely one aspect of the clear power of prison
authorities to classify prisoners for administrative purposes. 3 4  Mat-
ters of classification typically affect many aspects of daily prison life,
such as place of confinement, eligibility for good time, work assign-
ments, access to medical care, likelihood of parole, and opportunity
to enjoy a wide range of available privileges.'83  Inmates also have
an interest in the classification of fellow prisoners, such as in segrega-
tion of violent individuals and those whose disruption of prison life
could cause the removal of privileges for other inmates.' 36 Accord-
ingly, the power to classify prisoners on the basis of their back-
grounds and records is fundamental to controlling a prison population
and administering its daily activities. The threat to prison security
posed by an inmate who has previously demonstrated an ability and
willingness to escape is obvious. Prison officials have a strong
interest in deterring future escapes by former escapees or other
inmates who would be encouraged by inmates who have been suc-
cessful in the past. The personal safety of prison guards and
members of the public are also endangered by escaping prisoners.
In view of these factors, the petitioners in Lamb, arguably, were
130. Id. at 562.
131. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
132. 418 U.S. at 563.
133. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
134. See H. KERPER & J. KEEPER, LEGAL RiGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 443-
51 (1974); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5120.03, .11, .16 (Page Supp. 1973).
135. H. KERPER & J. KERPER, supra note 134, 446-47.
136. Id. at 447.
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treated leniently in view of their records of escape. At least one
court has allowed much more severe disciplinary measures to be im-
posed because of an inmate's record of escape, even though he had
already been convicted and sentenced for his escape.'8 7 Thus, it
appears that the Lamb double jeopardy theory is unstable at best.
Chances of its acceptance are, in all probability, slight.
In re Lamb, while proposing an expansion of prisoners' rights to
due process and a novel double jeopardy attack upon prison
disciplinary sanctions, has major significance as a guidepost in the
development of Ohio habeas corpus law. The expansion of the
statutory habeas corpus remedy to take cognizance of a prisoner's
challenge of disciplinary treatment resulting in the loss of good time
would make an effective state remedy available where such did not
exist before. As a result of Preiser, all challenges seeking injunctions
for restoration of good time or immediate release would have to be
initially resolved in Ohio habeas corpus proceedings before federal
litigation could be commenced.' 38 While it is true that a state
prisoner could easily circumvent this exhaustion requirement by pro-
ceeding under section 1983, if he does not seek release or an injunc-
tion for restoration of good time, 189 such tactics would take consider-
ably longer than initially petitioning for relief under Ohio habeas
corpus. 140 Regardless of why the Ohio habeas corpus remedy is
sought, the importance of having state courts conduct the initial
resolution of constitutional issues that directly affect prison admin-
istration should not be minimized. State court rulings on these issues
can be res judicata on subsequent section 1983 suits by the prisoner
and can even influence his subsequent federal habeas corpus hear-
ings.14' It is perhaps equally significant that many prisoner com-
plaints will probably allege abuse of discretion by prison officials in
their efforts to comply with the due process requirements established
in Wolff v. McDonnell.142  In assessing that exercise of discretion,
Ohio courts should be better informed than federal courts on the
strengths and weaknesses of Ohio penal policy. As long as state
137. Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Sapp. 497 (S.D. Ga. 1970). However, this in-
mate was arguably more dangerous than were the petitioners in Lamb. The
Georgia prisoner's record consisted of three escapes, one attempted escape, and
commission of a kidnapping while escaped.
138. See notes 62-66, 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
139. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
140. See note 61 supra.
141. See notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text.
142. See notes 96-102 supra and accompanying text.
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courts are sufficiently sensitive to prisoners' constitutional rights as
well as to state interests, their pronouncements on the implementa-
tion of the standards in Wolff v. McDonnell are likely to carry great
weight in a Supreme Court that has shown a strong desire to leave
supervision of state penal institutions as much as possible to state
judicial and administrative bodies. 143
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143. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.s. 475 (1973).
